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‘There Is Relief That It Seems to Be Working’:  
BP’s Integrated Community-Based Security Strategy 
in West Papua
When environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa was 
executed by the Nigerian Government in 1995, 
oil giant, Shell, made global headlines for alleged 
complicity in human rights violations. This case drew 
attention to the activities of multinational corporations 
(MNCs) operating abroad and gave rise to a vigorous 
debate on the human rights obligations of business. 
Twenty years on, it is now generally accepted that 
MNCs do have a responsibility to respect human 
rights, even if their host countries and security forces 
do not share the same commitment. This is reflected 
in the United Nations’ first endorsement of a business 
and human rights initiative, the ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework and the widespread adoption of 
human rights policies by individual companies.
A prominent concern within the extractive 
industries is risks associated with the employment of 
public and private security guards at large resource 
sites. MNCs are apprehensive about being seen as 
complicit in human rights abuses through security 
payments and collaboration with security personnel. 
To help address these concerns, governments, 
extractive companies and non-government 
organisations have collaborated to develop the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
(VPs), a set of principles that guide companies in how 
to maintain the safety of their operations alongside a 
commitment to international human rights standards. 
Importantly, the VPs recognise that companies can 
play a supportive role in security-sector reform, as 
reflected in the growing number of firms (including 
Shell) actively engaged in providing human rights 
training for security personnel. This In Brief discusses 
what is considered one of the first applications of 
the VPs: BP’s Integrated Community Based Security 
(ICBS) strategy in West Papua. Specifically, it draws 
on interviews conducted as part of a major study on 
corporate social responsibility and natural resource 
conflict that describes how this model was formulated 
by BP Indonesia executives (McKenna in press).
Indonesia’s handling of human rights has led it 
to be considered ‘one of three countries (along with 
Colombia and Nigeria) in which human rights in 
the corporate sphere are most obviously endangered’ 
(Ballard 2001:9). This is especially true in West 
Papua where there are ongoing allegations of torture, 
forced disappearances, extra-judicial killings and the 
application of treason and blasphemy laws to limit 
freedom of expression.
Human rights violations have been of particular 
concern in areas surrounding Freeport-McMoRan’s 
Grasberg mining complex. With a financial interest in 
maintaining a presence at Grasberg, the Indonesian 
military has been accused of orchestrating numerous 
shooting incidents in the area and then blaming the 
attacks on Papuan separatists. Those who link the 
shootings to the military believe they are an attempt 
by the military to demonstrate their importance 
to Freeport in order to secure ongoing security 
payments. These shootings, along with other violent 
incidents (Ballard 2001), have raised questions about 
whether it is possible for MNCs to invest in West 
Papua, while maintaining a commitment to human 
rights principles.
BP entered West Papua in 2005 as the operator 
of the Tangguh Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 
project. Based on the prior experience of Freeport, 
BP acknowledged that security would be the most 
difficult and sensitive issue the company would 
face in its Tangguh operations. As with Freeport, 
BP is required to subsidise public security expenses 
mandated by the government but, as an alternative 
to relying upon the Indonesian security forces, has 
implemented the ICBS strategy.
The development of ICBS came in response to 
recommendations by international human rights 
consultants that BP should limit the deployment of 
security personnel in the vicinity of the Tangguh 
project. Following local, regional and national 
consultations on how this might be achieved, a 
concept was identified in Indonesian defence doctrine 
referring to a model of community policing that 
had never been used to provide security at a major 
extractive site. When this was discovered,
BP organised a national conference of 
community security with the national security 
guardian board, with the generals who train 
the police on the philosophy of the country. 
They advised us to bring this to the national 
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security board for them to agree … We said 
it is the same as community-based policing. 
(BP Indonesia employee, interview with 
author, Jakarta)
Three specific commitments BP has made with 
regard to ICBS include: (1) the use of an unarmed 
‘inner ring’ of Papuans, many from the local area, for 
everyday security of the project, (2) a commitment 
to only call the police, not the military, and only if a 
security problem escalates, and (3) the provision of 
human rights training (including the VPs and United 
Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force) for ICBS, 
police and military personnel who would be called in 
if a security incident were to intensify (TIAP 2014).
BP has received praise for its security approach in 
West Papua. Internationally, it is cited as an example 
of ‘innovation’ in conflict-sensitive business practice. 
ICBS has also attracted recommendation within 
Indonesia, with claims from a panel established by 
BP ‘to provide external advice to senior BP decision-
makers regarding non-commercial aspects of the 
Tangguh LNG Project’ (TIAP 2014:1) that ‘security 
officials are encouraging other companies to adopt 
similar security models’ (ibid.:21). On the other hand, 
the same source suggests ‘there is little familiarity’ 
with the ICBS system at the national level, but ‘there is 
relief that it seems to be working effectively and that 
no security or human rights issues have developed 
at Tangguh’ (ibid.:9). Adding further complexity 
is that little independent research on ICBS has 
been conducted.
While it is reported that ‘no political violence, 
separatist inspired or otherwise’ (TIAP 2014:19) 
has occurred at Tangguh, BP has faced similar 
problems to Freeport with regard to the Indonesian 
security forces’ history of economic interests in 
natural resource projects. One of the biggest risks the 
company has faced in its implementation of ICBS 
is that Indonesian security forces might orchestrate 
attacks similar to the shooting incidents around 
Freeport. Indonesian military agents were suspected 
of provoking violence even before the construction 
of Tangguh in ‘an unconventional bid for a lucrative 
“protection” contract’ (Kirksey 2009:150–1). Kirksey 
and Grimston (20/7/2003) also claim that while BP 
has sought to cut the military out of a security deal, 
‘the company is using officers from the country’s 
feared Mobile Police Brigade (Brimob) — which has 
been accused of numerous human rights abuses’. 
Further, even though ICBS has been well received by 
some Papuan non-government organisation workers 
and religious leaders, not all Papuans are convinced 
about community security. As one Papuan religious 
leader commented, ‘I am still so pessimistic about 
this because they are contractors for the government. 
There must be government responsibility inside to 
protect—there must be army or policemen inside even 
if not in uniform’ (interview with author, Jayapura).
BP’s ICBS strategy in West Papua suggests that 
international business and human rights initiatives 
might open valuable opportunities for MNCs to 
contribute to security-sector reform in their areas 
of operation. Before promoting ICBS as a ‘model 
program’, however, it is crucial that more research be 
conducted into how successful this strategy actually 
is, how it works, how it relates to non-security-related 
human rights concerns (e.g. discrimination), and 
how BP’s ability to implement ICBS might reflect on 
broader changes within the political economies of 
West Papua and Indonesia. If, in fact, BP is deemed 
to have successfully avoided human rights violations 
after 10 years of operations in West Papua, ICBS might 
offer important lessons on human rights protection 
at other extractive sites, both within Indonesia and 
internationally.
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